SlowMist Finds Data-Stealing and Address-Swapping Code in Udesk Scripts

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SlowMist identified JavaScript tied to Udesk’s customer service chat widget that collected visitors’ login data and swapped crypto deposit addresses on at least three trading sites. The same payload could alter both the address shown on screen and the address copied by a user, and its data collection extended beyond three site-specific targeting rules.

Key claims & sources

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The payload could change both the address shown on screen and the address copied by a user.
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The data collection in the payload went beyond three site-specific targeting rules.
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SlowMist said JavaScript tied to Udesk’s chat widget collected visitors’ login data.
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SlowMist said the same script replaced crypto deposit addresses on at least three trading sites.

What it means

Udesk is a customer service chat widget that websites embed, so code inside it can reach users across multiple sites at once. SlowMist’s analysis focused on JavaScript in that widget and was published after the firm spotted the code during routine threat-intelligence work. The specific risk here is not a normal site bug but a third-party script sitting in a common customer support layer, which can touch logins and payment instructions on pages that rely on it.

For people using crypto exchanges or trading sites, an address swap inside a deposit flow means the destination they think they are sending to can differ from what the site actually copies or displays. That puts more weight on manual address checks and on the integrity of embedded services that sit outside the core exchange backend. Site operators that use shared widgets have to review third-party JavaScript more aggressively, because a single embedded component can affect several properties at once. (per thedefiant.io)

This case sits at the meeting point of convenience and control: a widely used support widget can make customer service easier, while the same integration can widen the blast radius of compromised code. Deposit-address manipulation is especially sensitive in crypto because transfers are hard to reverse once sent, so tampering with the visible destination strikes at a basic trust assumption. The tension is between fast, reusable web tooling and the need to keep asset-transfer interfaces isolated from outside scripts.

Still open is which websites besides the three already identified used the affected code, and whether the same payload appeared in other Udesk deployments. SlowMist’s report establishes what the firm found in the script, but it does not settle how widely the code was spread or how long it remained in place. A fuller answer would come from additional site checks, vendor disclosure, and confirmation from the operators of the affected trading sites.

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Oct 27 10:27
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